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Argument 
1. The Department of Workforce Services (DWS) failed to abide by their own rule 
requiring an analysis of time in school and financial loss when a claimant expresses 
a willingness to leave school for work, and such failure is arbitrary and capricious 
action. 
U.A.C. R994-403-117c provides that when a claimant expresses a willingness to 
leave school for work the factors to be considered against such a claim are the time 
already invested in school and the financial loss that would accrue for leaving school.1 
The rule is not discretionary; it provides that these factors "must be weighed" against the 
claimant's expressed intent to leave school. The rule does not suggest that other factors, 
such as renting a home, making arrangements for school prior to losing employment, or 
even moving to attend school are factors in considering the credibility and intent of the 
claimant who expresses the intent to leave school for work. 
Nothing in the record, nor in the DWS brief provides adequate analysis on the two 
required factors in considering the Petitioner's claim. The DWS brief even states the 
rule, but fails to provide any helpful analysis with respect to these factors. Respondent's 
brief at 6-7. 
The financial analysis is incomplete because the DWS does not even attempt to 
determine the amount of financial loss, relying instead on inferences to be drawn from 
the amounts found in the record which were only cursorily examined in the hearing and 
conclusory statements. Id. The DWS appears to rely heavily on the amount of student 
1
 Petitioner's expression of this intent is found at R. 16:31-42. 
1 
loans, ignoring completely the reality that those loans were also used to provide family 
needs. The legislature specifically mentioned these same family needs in the policy 
underlying unemployment benefits. U.C.A. § 35A-4-102. Furthermore, when benefits 
were denied in early January 2003,100% of the Spring semester tuition was still 
refundable, another reality that is completely ignored in the DWS' incomplete financial 
analysis. 
The time in school factor is given even less consideration. The DWS brief 
mentions only that at the time of the hearing there was six weeks of schooling left. 
Respondent's brief at 7. The conclusory statement is based on conditions at the time of 
the hearing, rather than at the time when benefits were actually denied (some 2 Vi months 
prior to the hearing). There is no analysis in the record or brief that suggests or implies 
that completion of one semester (of a six semester endeavor) is such a substantial 
investment that one would be unlikely to abandon the pursuit. Even at the time of the 
hearing only about half of the Spring semester had been completed (or approximately 
one-quarter of the total education required for graduation in this case). It is arguable that 
the lion's share of the school work for that semester had not been completed at the time 
of the hearing (since large paper assignments become due toward the end of the semester, 
and preparation for final exams had not even begun). Thus, though the DWS implies that 
the first year was almost complete, an arguably more accurate statement is that less than 
half of the Spring semester requirements had been completed at the time of the hearing, 
and that less than one-quarter of the total requirements for graduation where complete. 
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Such incomplete analysis should not be the basis for a determination against the 
Petitioner. Adams v. Board of Review of Indus. Com'n, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
(failure of agency to make adequate findings supporting a conclusion can result in 
resolution of issue in petitioner's favor), also Petitioner's Brief at 12-16. Even if this 
court were to accept the conclusory statements, the DWS has arbitrarily and capriciously 
molded the conclusions without adequately considering the requirements of the rule. 
"[Administrative regulations are presumed to be reasonable and valid and cannot be 
ignored or followed by the agency to suit its own purposes. Such is the essence of 
arbitrary and capricious action/' R.O.A. General, Inc. v. Utah Dept. of Transp., Dist 
Three, 996 P.2d 840, 842 (Utah 1998) (alteration in original) (citing State ex rel Dep't of 
Community Affairs v. Utah Merit Sys. Council, 614 P.2d 1259,1263 (Utah 1980)). Even 
if the court allows considerations beyond those stated in the rule, the DWS's failure to 
adequately consider the factors required by the rule is arbitrary and capricious action. 
2. The substantial evidence standard for upholding an agency factual conclusion 
requires that the conclusion is reasonable and rational. 
When challenging an agency's factual conclusions an appellant must marshal all 
evidence supporting the agency finding, and show that the findings are not supported by 
substantial evidence. Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm!n} 858 P.2d 1381,1385 
(Utah 1993). 
"Substantial evidence is that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that 
is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion. This 
standard does not require or specify a quantity of evidence but requires only 
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion." 
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WWC Holding Co., Inc. v. Public Service Com'n of Utah, 44 P.3d 714, 718 (Utah 2002) 
(quoting Harken Southwest Corp. v. Bd. of Oil, Gas and Mining, 920 P.2d 1176,1180 
(Utah 1996)). Utah courts review "administrative conclusions under an intermediate 
standard of review and uphold[] them, so long as they are reasonable and rational." 
Vernon C. Young, M.D., P.C. v. Board of Review of Indus. Com'n of Utah, Dept. of 731 
P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1986). However, in evaluating the evidence for a conclusion, the 
court "will not sustain a decision which ignores uncontradicted, competent, credible 
evidence to the contrary." WWC Holding, 44 P.3d at 718. 
The issue here is really one of priority, was the Petitioner more intent on 
completing law school or working to provide for his family. If schooling was prioritized 
higher than finding work, then a conclusion that the Petitioner was not available for work 
is appropriate. In marshalling the arguments for why school would be more important 
than work, there are no uncontroverted justifications. The most obvious reason one 
would prioritize school over work is to achieve a better financial reward. However, this 
reasoning has little or no support in the record. In fact, a reasonable financial analysis 
suggests that Petitioner and his family are substantially worse off by incurring debt and 
foregoing the income that could be earned during the three years required for law school. 
Petitioner's Brief at 14-15. 
The record does appear to show that Petitioner was willing to make substantial 
changes affecting his family in order to attend law school. For example, Petitioner rented 
his home and moved his family to a new area, despite Petitioner's desire to remain in 
Utah. (R. 15.) The record indicates this dilemma as a choice between remaining in Utah 
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unemployed, or moving and attending law school (R. 17.); yet the record also reveals that 
Petitioner's work search expanded to include jobs outside even Utah or Washington. (R. 
19.) Thus, once Petitioner recognized a need to move outside Utah, his work search also 
expanded to other areas of the country.2 Petitioner also expressed his willingness to 
move for work, indicating that Petitioner was willing to make substantial changes for 
work, even after having moved for school. 
There is one other argument that Petitioner can marshal: If Petitioner intended 
only to attend school while he was employed, why did he continue to pursue school even 
after losing his job? The Petitioner was laid off in mid-April 2001 and began 
immediately searching for work. (R. 27,15.) Completing additional applications to law 
schools (after becoming unemployed) occurred approximately at the end of June, 
indicating that 2 lA months elapsed between getting laid-off and renewing the efforts for 
entering law school. (R. 17.) Thus, the record reveals that Petitioner's work search had 
continued unsuccessfully for some time before Petitioner continued pursuing law school. 
Petitioner's prospects for finding work appeared dim, and having been accepted to law 
school Petitioner faced a dilemma: remain in Utah, unemployed and searching for work, 
or make substantial changes to improve the likelihood of finding work (moving to a new 
area, expanding the work search, and beginning school in a new profession). Petitioner's 
choice was ratified by the DWS Board, who wrote: 
2
 Respondent's brief suggests that Petitioner moved to a less populous area and thus 
limited his work search. Since Petitioner's home was in Utah County, it would seem 
appropriate to compare Utah County with Spokane County. According to the US 2000 
census data (available at www.census.gov), Spokane County is more populous than Utah 
County. 
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"The Board is sympathetic to the claimant's dilemma. He, like others in 
this economy, is taking dramatic measures to increase his employability 
and financial stability. He recognizes the fickleness of the economy and 
wants to increase his employability while staying employed as best he can. 
Even though he would rather be working, he has attempted to make his 
period of unemployment productive by furthering his education." 
(R. 34-35.) The Board also describes Petitioner's choice as reasonable. Id. 
While these arguments establish that it is possible that Petitioner was more 
attached to school than he was to work, they do not address the uncontroverted evidence 
already presented: Petitioner desire to provide for his family's needs (Petitioner's brief at 
13% and the uncertainty of finding work even after completing the education (Petitioner's 
brief at 14). As indicated above, the court should not favor the agency's conclusion 
when "uncontradicted, competent, credible evidence to the contrary" exists. WWC 
Holding, 44 P.3d at 718. Such evidence exists, and the DWS failed to include any 
consideration of that evidence. The DWS's failure to address these substantial 
considerations establishes that their conclusions are not reasonable or rational. 
3. Petitioner's response to unsupported allegations in Respondent's brief. 
a. The DWS suggests that Petitioner refused to accept a $9/hour job offer after 
searching for work for almost a year. Respondent's brief at 11. Petitioner admits that 
refusal to accept suitable work can result in a denial of benefits. The unemployment rules 
require that unemployed individuals must reduce wage expectations "until it reaches the 
prevailing local wage for work in that occupation." U.A.C. R994-405-309(6)(c). 
Computer and Information Systems managers (the closest match to Petitioner's 
substantial employment history) can expect to earn on average $32.80/hour 
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(~$68,000/year) according to the DWS website. See 
http://jobs.utah.gov/wi/pubs/WnI/UOW/provoorem.pdf, available on April 3, 2004. 
Technical sales people (the closest match to Petitioner's most recent work history) can 
expect $30.60/hour (~$63,500/year) on average. Id. Even if the court accepts the DWS's 
allegation, computer support specialists (a position for which Petitioner was substantially 
overqualified) can expect $12/hour on average. Id. Thus, even the DWS's own data 
reveal the unsuitability of the job possibility under the rule. Furthermore, the record does 
not establish when the offer was presented and refused, or even if it was a bona fide work 
opportunity. (R. 21.) 
b. The DWS suggests that work as a psychologist should have been pursued, since 
that was the area of Petitioner's undergraduate study. Respondent's brief at 9. It is 
axiomatic that psychologists require more education than a bachelor's degree, which is 
all Petitioner had attained. (R. 14.) As before, the DWS data also indicate that 
prospective work was more available in the computer industry than it was in the social 
science arena, justifying Petitioner's search in the area most familiar to him, and entirely 
encompassing Petitioner's professional career. See DWS website at 
http://jobs.utah.gov/wi/pubs/outlooks/state/statebriefmostopenings.pdf, available on April 
3, 2004. 
c. The DWS alleges that the Board did not have an opportunity to review the 
decision awarding benefits to Petitioner in October 2001, and, as a result, implies that 
such a decision is in no way binding upon the DWS as argued in Petitioner's Brief. 
Respondent's brief at 10. The DWS rules provide otherwise: 
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"The [statute] requires that the Department be given notice of the pendency 
of an appeal and that the Department will be a party to the proceedings. ... 
As a party to the hearing the Department or its representatives have all 
rights and responsibilities of other interested parties to present evidence, 
bring witnesses, cross-examine witnesses, give rebuttal evidence, and 
appeal decisions of the Administrative Law Judge." 
U.A.C. R994-406-313. Since the DWS did have the right to appeal, the court should rule 
in Petitioner's favor for the DWS's failure to justify their inconsistency as required by 
U.C.A. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii). 
Conclusion 
The DWS has attempted several avenues to obstruct Petitioner's access to 
unemployment benefits. In the Petitioner's first appeal, an ALJ for the DWS allowed 
benefits, concluding that Petitioner "is primarily a member of the labor market and only 
secondarily a student." (R. 65.) A few months later, the DWS denied benefits and a 
different ALJ concluded that the substantially identical fact pattern indicated that 
Petitioner was primarily a student. On Petitioner's appeal to the Board, the Board 
affirmed the denial of benefits, but claimed that Petitioner's work search had been 
inadequate.3 Now, on appeal to this court, the DWS appears to retreat from the Board's 
primary reasoning and reasserts the AJJ's conclusion that Petitioner is primarily a 
student. 
Though the reasoning for denying benefits has shifted back and forth, Petitioner 
has consistently maintained that providing for his family is his most important task, and 
3
 The Board's reasoning was grounded on an ineffective work search, though, without 
additional analysis or discussion, the Board also adopted the ALJ's reasoning and 
conclusions. (R. 35.) The Board failed entirely to address any of the shortcomings 
identified in the Petitioner's appeal to that body. (R. 31-32.) 
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that he would drop out of school for work that can meet those needs. The DWS rules 
specifically require consideration of two factors under these conditions, yet the DWS has 
failed throughout all of these proceedings to provide anything more than cursory and 
conclusory analysis to the time in school and financial loss factors. An agency commits 
arbitrary and capricious action when they fail to abide by the established rules. For this 
reason, the court should reverse the Board's decision and award benefits to Petitioner. 
An agency's conclusions are also subject to judicial review if the agency's 
conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Courts will defer to 
an agency's decision when there is enough evidence to justify that the agency's decision 
is a reasonable conclusion based on the record evidence. However, such deference is not 
allowed when an agency ignores uncontroverted, competent, and credible evidence 
contrary to the agency's decision. Here, such evidence exists. The greatest evidence is 
found in Petitioner's position after completing school. Despite the substantial financial 
investment and forgone earning potential, Petitioner will still be in a position were he 
must still find employment. In addition, Petitioner's family's needs are only being met 
by taking student loans, which compromises the future stability of the family, especially 
where Petitioner must still secure employment. These are substantial justifications which 
establish the conclusion that Petitioner would leave school for work, and are 
uncontroverted by any evidence or theory explaining why remaining in law school would 
be a tiigner priority than accepting work. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Wi 
I certify that two copies of Petitioner's-Brief, including any attachments and enclosures, 
were hand delivered to the Workforce Appeals Board, Respondent in this matter, on 
April 6, 2004 at the following address: 
Workforce Appeals Board, Department of Workforce Services 
40.E 300 South 
al) Lake City, UT 84145-0244 
Paul Hammer 
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